# The second Intifada as an expression of the 'New Terrorism': Change of the Threat level Posed by Terrorism to the Modern State

[1]David Schwartz, [2]Daniel Galily

[1]Department of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
[2]Department of Social Science & Humanities, Beijing Geely University, China

*Abstract:* **Considering the above analysis, we should address the 'new terrorism' that was created by Palestinian organizations as an existential threat from the inside comparable to the invasion of Arab armies as an external threat and not as a 'nuisance' to the lifestyle that can be lived with for many years. Like armies can destroy a country from the outside, the 'new terrorism', which was expressed in the second Intifada, can destroy a modern state from the inside.**

*Keywords:* **New Terrorism, Terrorism, Israel Studies, Israeli-Palestinian conflict.**

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The research study is the influences of the second intifada (Intifada 'at Al-Aqsa) in the economic and social terms on the State of Israel and its implications on our current perception of the threat of terrorism to the modern state.

The article study will examine the validity of the argument accepted in the research literature that defines terrorism as the way a certain organization uses to achieve political goals through the sowing of fear in the population as to influence public opinion but not as a threat that can existentially threaten a modern Western society. For this purpose, economic data in Israel that address the period of the beginning of the 21st century during the events of the second Intifada will be examined.

**What is the classical definition terrorism?**

Terrorism is politically motivated violence planned and carried out by groups and individuals in the sub-national level, or by secret agents at the national level, especially against civilian targets.

The goals of terrorism can be defined as the harming of innocent people in order to achieve political goals. [1]

**Research Hypotheses:**

The research hypothesis is that a high number of terrorist attacks constitutes a high level of threat to the modern state. This hypothesis comes following the terrorism that attacked Israel in the time of the second Intifada in the year 2000 and reached its climax two years later.

---

[1] Harkavi, Yehoshofat, & Segel, Avi, 1996, War and Strategy – Learning Guide (Tel Aviv: The Open University of Israel).

This hypothesis is primarily influenced by the high level of terrorist attacks that was expressed in this Intifada and was far greater than in the past and by the level of harm that this attacked caused the attacked country. Following this intifada, the research study examines the level of threat of terrorism (like that expressed in the second Intifada – 'new terrorism') on a Western modern state in general and holds that as the state acquires more characteristics that are Western it will be more vulnerable to terrorism.

In the research literature, terrorism is considered violence planned from political motives and performed by groups and individuals on the subnational level or by secret agents on the national level towards primarily civilian targets and so as to influence public opinion[2].

Terrorism enables small groups of combatants to draw attention to their actions above any relationship to their weight. This is a form of fighting in which few means are required and it can be performed by a few people and thus those who adopt it can emphasize their complaint or their message to the public in the same country or to global public opinion[3].

## 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

According to the traditional literature, terrorism does not consider to be an existential threat of a modern state. The perception of terrorism as a threat is separate from the perception of an existential threat.

The reference to terrorism on the one hand and to an existential threat on the other characterizes them as two different factors. Terrorism is perceived as a device for the achievement of goals and not as something that threatens the existential entity of a modern state[4].

An example can be seen in Israel's perception of safety, which focuses on providing a solution to two types of threats. The first type of threat is an existential threat or in other words, protection against enemy states that rise up to destroy it. In contrast, the second type of threat is acts of terrorism and hostility against the home-front so as to break Israeli society and achieve political goals[5].

Terrorist attacks have occurred throughout history. Their goal was to harm people, to kill them, or to maim them, so as to remove them from the arena of action and/or to intimidate them and their environment by the very threat of the terrorist attack. Only recently has this concept gained prominence. Today, it is possible to define terrorism as murder and harm of innocents to intimidate for political goals, and from the start two factors were prominent: the terrorist attack and the threat of an attack.

In the modern era, terrorism was implemented as a distinct method of warfare after rural guerilla warfare encountered difficulties. Terrorism in its current political form came from the failure of guerilla warfare. While guerilla warfare was used against representatives of the government or to intimate the people and exert discipline over them, it was without terrorism becoming the center of gravity in the fighting. As aforementioned, terrorism as fighting was first called 'urban guerilla warfare'. The success of terrorism as 'urban guerilla warfare' derives from the weakening of 'rural guerilla warfare'.

Terrorism in the modern era was primarily enabled because of the great vulnerability of modern society. This vulnerability derives from the centralization of social life in a modern state. The centralization characterizes not only the government systems but also all areas of modern life, such as transportation systems, communication systems, economic systems, and so on[6].

---

[2] Harkavi, Yehoshofat, & Segel, Avi, 1996, War and Strategy – Learning Guide (Tel Aviv: The Open University of Israel).

[3] Netanyahu, Binyamin (Ed.) 1987, Terrorism –How the West Can Win (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv Library).

[4] Slone, Michelle, 2000, Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism, in: J. of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 508-522.

[5] Farkash, Ze'evi, & Farkash, Aharon, 2002, The Strategic Environment of Israel, In: Strategic Update, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 32-36.

[6] Harkavi, Yehoshofat, 1990, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Systems Press).

## 3. WHAT IS THE 'NEW TERRORISM'?

The 'New Terrorism' is a type of terrorism that is different from many types of terrorism that were expressed in the past. The concept of 'New Terrorism' is a term that reflects the assessment that an essential change has occurred in a number of aspects of terrorism, when the threat it reflects is today far more severe[7].

The strategic goals of this terrorism, which is identified with Islamic terrorism, are phrased in a way that does not take into account negotiations and compromise. This perception explains willingness to cross lines regarding the severity of the terrorist attack, such as more frequent suicide attacks than in the past[8].

The fear of retribution is not a consideration of restraint: cells dispersed in the international arena are free of considerations that dictate caution to organizations that depend on a territorial base and a base of popular support. These organizations are characterized by relative autonomy, by blurred organizational boundaries, and by the lack of a regular command hierarchy, in addition to the increase of the number of effective suicide attacks (The second Intifada) and their unprecedented effectiveness (the September 11 terrorist attacks, which this type of terrorism succeeded in executing[9].)

## 4. INFLUENCE OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM ON THE ISRAELI ECONOMY DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA

The second Intifada is the name given by the Palestinians to their uprising against the State of Israel. The other name for this intifada used for the most part also in Israel is the Al-Aqsa's Intifada, which was given by the Israeli media[10]. This uprising included in the beginning popular protests but quickly the main characteristic of this conflict was the terrorist and guerilla actions against the citizens of Israel, the Israeli security forces, the Israeli settlers, and the Israeli and Jewish missions abroad[11]. The intifada caused a recession in Israel, when the climax occurred in the years 2002 and 2003[12].

A significant characteristic of the Palestinian activity in this struggle is the widespread use of suicide bombings. Israel, on its part, extended the use of targeted killings of terrorists, conducted extensive arrests of terrorists in the territories, and performed frequent ambushes of terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza. All these actions, according to the security system, were intended to prevent the occurrence of future terrorist attacks[13].

Many research studies on the topic of terrorism argued that constant war, like the war of terrorism, weakens the country's powers and resources[14]. A factor that facilitates the appearance of terrorism is the rise of the vulnerability of modern societies, which derives from their centralization. In modern societies there are focuses and intersections where damage to them paralyzes the country's economic and social life, and therefore such blows are destructive. These include electric power stations, transformer batteries, telephone and communication exchanges, radio and television stations, refineries, nuclear reactors, gas pipelines, and train stations, as well as taking down airplanes, harm to computer information systems of banks, and so on[15].

---

[7] Kurtz, Einat, 2003, "New Terrorism", New Challenges, Old Dilemmas, Strategic Update, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 9-15.

[8] Catignani, Sergio, 2005, The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in: J. of Strategic Studies, vol.28, no.1, pp. 57-75.

[9] Kurtz, Einat, 2003, "New Terrorism", New Challenges, Old Dilemmas, Strategic Update, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 9-15.

[10] Malam: The Center for the Heritage of the Intelligence, The Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, 2005, www.intelligence.org.il

[11] Catignani, Sergio, 2005, The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in: J. of Strategic Studies, vol.28, no.1, pp. 57-75.

[12] Gronau, Reuven, 2002, Security Threat and Economic Crisis: The Influence of Terrorism on the Israeli Economy (Jerusalem: The Israeli Institute for Democracy), the Tenth Economic Convention.

[13] Malam: The Center for the Heritage of the Intelligence, The Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, 2005, www.intelligence.org.il

[14] Shiftan, Dan, 2002, The Power of Determent – Challenges and Solution, In: State and Society, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 339-370.

[15] Harkavi, Yehoshofat, 1990, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Systems Press).

In the year 2000, there was a recession that was caused by the destructive terrorist attacks that reached their climax in 2002[16]. In the year 2002, when Israeli society suffered two to three terrorist attacks a day[17], the economy suffered harsh blows in a number of dimensions:

1. The annual growth plummeted sharply in two years, from 14.1% in the year 2000 to -8.5% in the year 2002.

2. The annual gross national product (GNP) in 2002 was 1.9%.

3. The foreign investments in Israel dropped by seven billion shekels.

4. The terrorism harmed the scope of construction and agriculture.

5. Unemployment in Israel rose by 1.5%.

6. There was a sharp decline of 63% in the entry of foreign tourists to Israel[18], considered one of the main low points in tourism to Israel since 1967[19].

It was said that there had not been such a bad year for Israel in economic terms as 2002, at the height of the terrorist attacks, since 1950[20].

However, in contrast, the year 2003 saw the beginning of the recovery process of the Israeli economy, which accelerated in the years 2004 and 2005.

1. There was rapid growth in the economy of 4.4% in 2004, which reached more than 5% in 2005.

2. The GNP rose by 4.6% in two years, after a decline of 5.8% in the previous two years.

3. Signs of recovery in tourism were apparent, and by the year 2005 the number of tourists in Israel rose by about 70%, although the level of Israeli tourism was still lower by 20% than in the period before the Palestinian terrorist attacks.

4. The industrial production recovered after a decline from the beginning of the intifada.

5. Since the year 2003, the foreign investments rose by 6.6 billion new Israel shekels in three years[21].

The security calm is considered one of the main factors of the renewed growth in the Israeli economy[22]. The calm was expressed in fewer terrorist attacks against Israel, which derived from the impressive success of the Israeli security forces in their struggle against Palestinian terrorism. The completion of the separation fence in the year 2005 made it difficult for the terrorist organizations to execute terrorist attacks in Israel. The assessment is that terrorist attacks against the citizens of Israel lessened by around 90% in a period of a few years. In the year 2002, there were 46 mass murder attacks that caused the death of 213 people and the injury of thousands. In the year 2003, in contrast, there were only 17 such attacks, with 138 dead and several hundred injured.

The year 2004 was characterized by many attempts to implement terrorist attacks but also by considerable successful prevention of such attacks by the security forces. However, only in the year 2005 was there a decline in the attempts to commit terrorist attacks. This followed the death of Yasser Arafat, the 'cease fire' agreement that Abu Mazen achieved with the terrorist organizations, and the focus of global attention on the Gaza Strip following the disengagement[23].

Following these data, it can be said that the terrorism displayed in the second Intifada in the years 2000-2003 had an impact on life in Israel. Life in Israel was sharply disrupted during the second Intifada, in which suicide bombings

---

[16] Ministry of Finance, 2005, Research Department, www.mot.gov.il/research/mazagot.

[17] Malam: The Center for the Heritage of the Intelligence, The Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, 2005, www.intelligence.org.il

[18] Ministry of Finance, 2005, Research Department, www.mot.gov.il/research/mazagot

[19] Ministry of Finance, 2005, Research Department, www.mot.gov.il/research/mazagot

[20] Ma'ariv, January 1, 2003.

[21] Ministry of Finance, 2005, Research Department, www.mot.gov.il/research/mazagot

[22] Ministry of Finance, 2005, Research Department, www.mot.gov.il/research/mazagot

[23] Malam: The Center for the Heritage of the Intelligence, The Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, 2005, www.intelligence.org.il

occurred frequently and made the centers of the cities in Israel into dangerous places. People's fear to be in the centers of the cities was expressed in their anxiety about being in public places and traveling on public transportation, primarily among the youths, in addition to mass departure of citizens from the large cities where terrorist attacks happened often[24].

Additional financial activity was harmed by such terrorist actions, which constituted one of the main factors for the recession that the economy suffered, as expressed in the increase in the unemployment, the decrease in the standard of living, the near complete elimination of tourism to Israel, and the flight of foreign investors from the country. At the peak, in the year 2002, the number of unemployed reached 300,000, constituting about 4% of the citizens of the country[25].

Moreover, it is said in the literature that following the extensive media coverage and lack of preparation of the citizens in the modern state to cope with this type of threat, terrorism causes terrible anxiety among the citizens and threatens the type and standard of modern life[26].

## 5. THE SECOND INTIFADA AS EXPRESSION OF THE 'NEW TERRORISM'

In the second Intifada, Islamic terrorism (a religious motive) was expressed, declaring publicly that it intends to fight Israel, both against its presence in all areas of Palestine (destruction) and against it as a symbol of Western 'heresy' according to the laws of Islam[27].

During the intifada, different governments in the Arab countries, such as Iraq before the war, Iran, and Syria helped the different terrorist organizations attack the military and population in Israel, providing money, experts, and manpower. The terrorist organizations, in contrast to previous years, used different countries around the world to launder money to finance their terrorist activities and main command centers in the Arab countries (Syria and Lebanon)[28].

The most prominent characteristic of the 'innovation' of this terrorism is the number of effective terrorist attacks, which, as aforementioned, reached its peak in the year 2002, when two to three terrorist attacks a day were committed against Israeli citizens and security forces. This is in contrast to the 1990s, when the terrorist attacks were conducted at a far lower frequency (once every few weeks or months)[29].

How Do the Influences of the second Intifada on the State of Israel Change Our Perception of the Degree of Threat Posed by Terrorism to the Modern State?

As previously stated, the type of terrorism that attacked Israel for the years of the second Intifada is the 'new terrorism', which is very different from the types of terrorism of the past. The concept of 'new terrorism' is a term that reflects the evaluation that an essential change has occurred in a number of aspects of terrorism, when the threat reflected from it is today far more serious.

The drastic change is that this terrorism was different from the terrorist attacks on the developed countries in the past in the frequency and success rate of these attacks, two to three attacks a day. The harm caused to Israel following the high number of attacks is greater than in the past in different aspects.

Now it is possible to ask the following question. What would have happened to Israel if the Israeli security forces had not been successful in halting the murderous terrorist attacks on the Israeli home front until 2002? It is possible only to assume what the situation of the Israeli home front would have been if the harm caused to the State of Israel in 2002 would have continued and worsened.

---

[24] Shamai, Michal, & Kimhi, Shaul, 2006, Exposure to Threat of War and Terror, Political Attitudes, Stress, and Life Satisfaction among Teenagers in Israel, in: J. of Adolescence, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 165-176.

[25] Gronau, Reuven, 2002, Security Threat and Economic Crisis: The Influence of Terrorism on the Israeli Economy (Jerusalem: The Israeli Institute for Democracy), the Tenth Economic Convention.

[26] Slone, Michelle, 2000, Responses to media coverage of terrorism, in: J. of conflict resolution, vol. 44, no. 4, p. 508-522.

[27] Kurtz, Einat, 2003, "New Terrorism", New Challenges, Old Dilemmas, Strategic Update, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 9-15.

[28] Malam: The Center for the Heritage of the Intelligence, The Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, 2005, www.intelligence.org.il

[29] Catignani, Sergio, 2005, The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in: J. of Strategic Studies, vol.28, no.1, pp. 57-75.

In my opinion, the Second Intifada changed the approach that maintains that a modern state can survive for many years with a terrorist attack, since the high number of successful attacks increases the economic harm caused to a modern state

A modern state is not prepared for wars at a large scale on the home front, since it is a modern state (the type of economy and way of life). Hence, non-modern states can wage a civil war for a long period of time and still remain a state. But as the state is expressed in modern characteristics, it is more vulnerable to hostile actions in the home front.

However, it can withstand conventional terrorism that holds a number of effective terrorist attacks for the purpose of intimidate, but terrorism of the type that attacked Israel in the second Intifada until 2002, which reached a level of two to three attacks a day, changed from effective in quality to primarily effective in quantity, expressed in everyday reality. Such a life routine in a Western country can cause the dissolution of society and economy in all areas, as long as the terrorism is not restrained. It is definitely possible to assume that the reason that Israel, as a modern state, did not fall apart completely is the effective activity of the Israeli security services from the year 2003 and onward.

To conclude, in light of the above analysis, we should address the 'new terrorism' that was created by Palestinian organizations as an existential threat from the inside comparable to the invasion of Arab armies as an external threat and not as a 'nuisance' to the lifestyle that can be lived with for many years. Like armies can destroy a country from the outside, the 'new terrorism', which was expressed in the second Intifada, can destroy a modern state from the inside.

------------